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Boundaries and Identity: 
The Legal Geography of the European Union and the United States of America 
 
Matteo Nicolini 
 
ABSTRACT 
This essay addresses the types of federalism found in the European Union (EU) and the United 
States of America from different perspectives. The first perspective is the traditional one, ac-
cording to which federal designs are the outcome of processes of evolution and adaptation. Both 
types of federalism have their roots in the process of the formation of their respective systems, 
and such processes have subsequently shaped their institutional designs. The second perspective 
is intimately related to the traditional one. It assumes a functional approach, and highlights the 
constitutional character RIWKH(8¶V³WUHDW\-EDVHGIHGHUDOLVP´6XFKDSHUVSHFWLYHKDVEHHQGe-
veloped by American scholars, who have been applying their vocabulary and concepts to EU 
federalism. It reveals an intimate relationship with constitutional identity, which a community 
incorporates into constitutional provisions. The essay focuses on the role of one of its constitu-
tive features of constitutional identity, i.e., the legal geography of the EU and the United States. 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: European Union, United States of America, Federalism, Constitutional 
Identity, Legal Geography  
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SUMMARY: 1. &RPSDULQJDQG&RQWUDVWLQJ WKH(8DQG WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV7KH µ7UDGLWLRQDO¶3HUVSHFWLYH. ± 2. Ap-
proaching the EU From a U.S.-Oriented Perspective: The Federal-Experience Perspective. ± 3. An Alternative Nar-
rative: Constitutional Identity and Territory Between Law, Geography, and Linguistics. ± 4. From Territory to Con-
stitutional Identities, via Legal Geography. ± 5. Towards a Thick Constitutional Identity and a Concrete Legal Ge-
ography for the EU. 
 
1. Comparing and Contrasting the EU and the United States: 
7KHµ7UDGLWLRQDO¶3HUVSHFWLYH 
 
When addressing the so-FDOOHG³IHGHUDOL]LQJSURFHVVHV´1 scholars usually refer to the EU and to 
the United States and elucidate VLPLODULWLHVDQGGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKHWZRSURWRW\SHVRI³IHd-
HUDWHG´Vystems.2 
This is not another essay dedicated to the constitutional evolution of the United States and the 
EU. Several contributions have been dedicated thereto, and in-depth analyses have pinpointed 
analogies and discrepancies between them.3 Nor will the article consist of a juxtaposition of the 
two federal designs. Comparative legal studies have speculative aims: comparing and con-
trasting the EU and U.S. forms of federalism give rise to noteworthy issues. This means that 
there is room left for comparative surveys, the significance of which depends on the perspec-
tives we choose when addressing the topic. 
First, there is the traditional perspective, according to which both the EU and the United States 
are the outcome of processes of evolution and adaptation. Their narratives are traced back to the 
historical formation of their federal systems, which has subsequently shaped their institutional 
GHVLJQV³7KHPDQQHUDQGFRQWH[WLQZKLFKDIHGHUDOV\VWHPFRPHVLQWREHLQJKDVDGLVWLQFWDQG
                                                 
1
 6HH)ULHGULFK&-³1HZ'LPHQVLRQVRI)HGHUDOLVP´Proceedings of the American Society of International 
Law at Its Annual Meeting (1921-1969) (April 25-27, 1963), pp. 238-240; Friedrich, C.J., Trends of Federalism in 
Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger 1968), p. 24; Burgess, M., In Search of the Federal Spirit: New Com-
parative Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2012). 
2
 See Bermann *$ ³7DNLQJ 6XEVLGLDULW\ 6HULRXVO\ )HGHUDOLVP LQ WKH (XURSHDQ &RPPXQLW\ DQG WKH 8QLWHG
6WDWHV´Columbia Law Review (no. 2, March 1994), pp. 331-456; Stein, E., Thoughts from a Bridge: A Retro-
spective of Writings on New Europe and American Federalism (Ann Arbor, MI, Michigan Publishing 2000).  
3
 Friedrich, C.J., Trends of Federalism, p. 160; Sandalow, T. and Stein, E. (Eds.), Courts and Free Markets: Per-
spectives from the United States and Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1982); )DKH\(³2n the Use of 
/DZLQ7UDQVDWODQWLF5HODWLRQV/HJDO'LDORJXHV%HWZHHQWKH(8DQG86´European Law Journal (no. 3, May 
2014), pp. 368-384.  
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pervasive influence on the kinds of governing institutions and decision-PDNLQJSURFHVVHV>«@
DGRSWHG´4 
This perspective reveals analogies between the EU and the U.S. forms of federalism. Both sys-
tems are formed through the aggregation/integration of political communities, and this aggrega-
WLYHQDWXUHVKHGVOLJKWRQWKHLULQVWLWXWLRQDOVWUXFWXUHVWKHIRUPDWLYHEDVLVLVUHIOHFWHGLQ³UHSUe-
VHQWDWLYHLQVWLWXWLRQV´5 i.e., the U.S. Senate and the EU Council of Ministers representing con-
stituent units.6 Such an influence PD\DOVREHGHWHFWHGLQPHPEHUVWDWHV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQGHFi-
sion-making processes allocated at the federal level.7 Furthermore, the U.S. Constitution and the 
European Treaties8 distribute legislative powers between tiers of government, and the principle 
of subsidiarity governs EU non-exclusive powers.9 
Finally, both systems establish a final adjudicator in constitutional issues: the Supreme Court 
and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), respectively.10 Nobody can deny their role as the main 
actors supporting the evolution of their respective constitutional frameworks. While performing 
WKHIXQFWLRQRI³UHVROXWLRQ´WKH(&-FRQWULEXWHGWRWKH³HYROXWLRQ´RIWKH(8WRZDUGD³FRQVWi-
tutional framework for a federal-W\SHVWUXFWXUH´11 This is apparent in the foundational period, 
where the constitutionalization of the European system rested on the judicial doctrines of direct 
effect, supremacy, and implied powers: the EU system of judicial review does highlight the 
changes in the original, confederative structure, and accentuates analogies between the same EU 
and federal states.12  
However, this perspective mainly emphasizes analogies, which can also be noticeable, e.g., the 
³IHGHUDO´QDUUDWLYHRUWKHSUHVHQFHRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDODGMXGLFDWRrs; differences, however, are even 
                                                 
4
 Aroney, N., The Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth. The Making and Meaning of the Australian Constitu-
tion (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2009), p. 39. 
5
 Watts, R.L., Comparing Federal Systems (Montreal et al., McGill-4XHHQ¶V8QLYHUVLW\3UHVVrd edition), p. 
135. 
6
 On the U.S. Senate, see :HFKVOHU+ ³7KH3ROLWLFDO 6DIHJXDUGV RI )HGHUDOLVP7KH Role of the States in the 
&RPSRVLWLRQDQG6HOHFWLRQRIWKH1DWLRQDO*RYHUQPHQW´ Columbia Law Review (no. 4, April 1954), pp. 543-
560. 
7
 6HH$URQH\1³5HSUHVHQWDWLRQDQG$PHQGPHQWLQ)HGHUDO&RQVWLWXWLRQV´The American Journal of Com-
parative Law (no. 2, Spring 2006), p. 282. 
8
 (87UHDWLHVDUH³WKHEDVLFFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFKDUWHU´RIWKHLQWHJUDWLRQSURFHVVVHH(&-&-294/83, Parti Ecologiste, 
³/HV9HUWV´v. European Parliament [1986] ECR 1,339, 1,365; ECJ, C-402/05, P ± Kadi and Al Barakaat Interna-
tional Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6,351. 
9
 6HH%DVW-DQGYRQ%RJGDQG\$³7KH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶V9HUWLFDO2UGHURI&RPSHWHQFHV7KH&XUUHQW/DZDQG
3URSRVDOVIRULWV5HIRUP´Common Market Law Review (no. 2, 2002), pp. 227-268. 
10
 6HH5RWK*+³,QFUHDVHG&RPSHWHQFHVWKURXJK'HYHORSPHQWRIWKH/DZ7KH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI-XVWLFHDQG
WKH866XSUHPH&RXUW´ LQ*UDEKHU*0DQG*DPSHU$ (GVLegal Narratives. European Perspectives on 
U.S. Law in Cultural Context (Wien, Springer 2009), pp. 195-211. 
11
 6WHLQ( ³7RZDUG D(XURSHDQ)RUHLJQ3ROLF\"(XURSHDQ)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV6\VWHP IURP WKH3HUVSHFWLYHRI WKH
8QLWHG6WDWHV&RQVWLWXWLRQ´ LQ0&DSSHOOHWWL06HFFRPEHDQG-++:HLOHU (GV Integration through Law: 
Europe and the American Federal Experience, vol. 1 (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter 1986), pp. 3-63. 
12
 Weiler, J.H.H., The Constitution of Europe. ³'RWKH1HZ&ORWKHV+DYHDQ(PSHURU"´DQG2WKHU(VVD\VRQ(u-
ropean Integration (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1998), p. 19. 
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more remarkable. Whereas the United States is a federal state, the EU lacks statehood, although 
LW KDV ³IHGHUDOL]LQJ IHDWXUHV´13 7KH ³IHGHUDO-OLNH´ FKDUDFWHU RI WKH LQWHJUDWLRQ SURFHVVPDNHV
federalism applicable to the EU14: it is the process, not the legal system, that has traits in com-
mon with the U.S. form of federalism. The legal system established by the Treaties simply re-
IOHFWVWKHVHWUDLWVEHFDXVHLWKDVEHHQHYROYLQJWRZDUG³DQHQWLW\ZKRVHFORVHVWVWUXFWXUDOPRGHl 
LV>«@SULQFLSDOO\WKHIHGHUDOVWDWH´15 
 
2. Approaching the EU From a U.S.-Oriented Perspective: 
The Federal-Experience Perspective 
 
The second perspective is intimately related to the traditional one, from which it draws several 
elements. When it comes to EU federalism, the second perspective assumes a functional ap-
proach, and severs the organizational and institutional traits from the functions exercised by the 
(8RUJDQL]DWLRQ IHGHUDOLVPWKXVGHQRWHV³DKLHUDUFKLFDO UHODWLRQVKLS´EHWZHHQ WKH(8DQG LWV 
members.16 This perspective conceives of the EU integration process as a dynamic blend of fed-
eral and international elements that merge into a unique polity. What makes the EU and the 
United States comparable is the constitutional character RI WKH (8¶V ³WUeaty-based federal-
LVP´17 7KHUHLVDVKLIWIURP³IHGHUDOIHDWXUHV´WR³IHGHUDOPHWKRGRORJ\´HYHQWKRXJKWKH(8LV
QRW GHVWLQHG WR EHFRPH D IHGHUDO VWDWH ³WKH UHOHYDQFH RI WKH IHGHUDO H[SHULHQFH WR(XURSH´ ± 
with the U.S. experience being the most relevant of all ± LVEHLQJ³LQFUHDVLQJO\UHFRJQL]HG´18 
In this regard, the role of U.S. scholarship with a background in constitutional legal studies is 
undeniable. On the one hand, American scholars have developed the main arguments supporting 
the federal character of the EU; on the other hand, they have supported the application of U.S. 
                                                 
13
 Hay, P., Federalism and Supranational Organizations. Patterns for New Legal Structures (Urbana, University of 
Illinois Press 1966), p. 90. 
14
 0F:KLQQH\(³µ&ODVVLFDO¶)HGHUDOLVPDQG6XSUD-National Integration or Treaty-Based Association: the Euro-
pean Community Movement as a Case-6WXG\´Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its 
Annual Meeting (1921-1969) (April 25-27, 1963), pp. 241-7D\ORU3³7KH3ROLWLFVRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPXQi-
WLHVWKH&RQIHGHUDO3KDVH´World Politics (no. 3, 1975), pp. 346-:DOODFH:³(XURSHDVD&RQIHGHUa-
tion: the Community and the Nation-6WDWH´Journal of Common Market Studies (no. 1-2, 1982), pp. 57-68. 
15
 Weiler, J.H.H., The Constitution of Europe, 12. 
16
 Hay, P., Federalism and Supranational Organizations, p. 90. On functional federalism, see Ortino, S., The No-
mos of the Earth. A short history on the connections between technological innovation, anthropological space and 
legal order (Baden-Baden, Nomos 2002), pp. 107-110. 
17
 See Oliver, C7³7KH(QIRUFHPHQWRI7UHDWLHVE\D)HGHUDO6WDWH´LQRecueil des Cours/Collected Courses 
of The Hague Academy of International Law (Leyde, A.W. Sijthoff 1974), pp. 331-6WHLQ(³7UHDW\-Based 
Federalism, A.D. 1979: A Gloss on Covey T. Oliver DWWKH+DJXH$FDGHP\´University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review (no. 4, April 1979), pp. 897-908, 900. 
18
 :HLOHU-++³(ULF6WHLQ$7ULEXWH´Michigan Law Review. Festschrift in Honor of Eric Stein (no. 5/6, 
April-May 1984), pp. 1160-1162, 1161. 
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FRQVWLWXWLRQDO³YRFDEXODU\´WRWKH(819 
Since it focuses on the role played by American scholars in the examination of European inte-
gration, the federal-experience perspective results in the application of a sort of federal-analogy 
test to the EU, as well as peculiar terminology. In this regard, the U.S. legal debate has been 
fruitful for the development of the European integration process.20 
Hence, the federal-experience approach reveals difficulties that arise because this perspective 
PHUHO\ORRNVDWWKH(8LQWHJUDWLRQSURFHVVWKURXJK86VFKRODUV¶H\HV21 i.e., it adopts the U.S. 
form of federalism as the archetype of comparative federal studies.22  
 
3. An Alternative Narrative: Constitutional Identity and Territory Between Law, Geogra-
phy, and Linguistics 
 
7KXV³>W@KHFRPSDUDWLYH$PHULFDQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOH[SHULHQFHZDV>«@WDNHQRYHUDVDPLQGVHW
as an intellectual pattern underlying the EU constitutional narrative which has won a dominant 
SRVLWLRQLQWKHOHJDOFRQVWUXFWLRQRI(XURSHDQLQWHJUDWLRQ´23 The reason why American scholars 
apply their vocabulary and concepts to the EU form of federalism may be traced back to the 
U.S. constitutional legal tradition, and reveals an intimate relationship with identity, and, in con-
stitutional comparative studies, identity counts as constitutional identity.24 The details of this as-
sumption will not detain us here: suffice it to say that the U.S. form of federalism possesses a 
strong constitutional identity that has been shaped during the course of its constitutional history 
and subsequent evolution. It is the same strong constitutional identity that also characterizes the 
                                                 
19
 6HH+DUWOH\&7³)HGHUDOLVP&RXUWVDQG/HJDO6\VWHPV7KH(PHUJLQJ&RQVWLWXWLRQRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPu-
QLW\´The American Journal of Comparative Law (no. 2, Spring 1986), pp. 229-247; Börzel, T.A., and Risse, T., 
³:KR ,V$IUDLGRI$(XURSHDQ)HGHUDWLon? How to Constitutionalize A Multi-/HYHO*RYHUQDQFH6\VWHP´ Jean 
Monnet Working Papers :HLOHU -++ ³)HGHUDOLVP DQG &RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP (XURSH¶V Sonderweg´ Jean 
Monnet Working Papers, 2000. 
20
 Particularly between the 1950s and the 1980s: see sXSUDQRWHVDQG6HHDOVR.XQ]-/³7UHDW\(VWDEOLVh-
LQJ WKH(XURSHDQ'HIHQFH&RPPXQLW\´The American Journal of International Law (no. 2, April 1953), pp. 
275-+D\3³6XSUHPDF\RI&RPPXQLW\/DZLQ1DWLRQDO&RXUWV$3URJUHVV5HSRUWRQReferrals under the 
((&7UHDW\´The American Journal of Comparative Law (no. 4, Autumn 1968), pp. 524-6WHLQ(³/Dw-
\HUV-XGJHVDQGWKH0DNLQJRID7UDQVQDWLRQDO&RQVWLWXWLRQ´The American Journal of International Law (no. 
1, January 1981), pp. 1-%RHUJHU$DQG5DVPXVVHQ0³7UDQVIRUPLQJ(XURSHDQ/DZ7KH(VWDEOLVKPHQWRI
WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO'LVFRXUVHIURPWR´European Constitutional Law Review (no. 2, September 2014) 
pp. 199-225. 
21
 6HH0DUWLQLFR*³5HDGLQJWKH2WKHUV $PHULFDQ/HJDO6FKRODUVDQGWKH8QIROGLQJ(XURSHDQ,QWHJUDWLRQ´;,
European Journal of Law Reform (no. 1, 2009), pp. 35-49. 
22
 See Riker, W., Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1964), 2 and 11; Bur-
gess, M., Comparative Federalism. Theory and Practice (Abingdon, Routledge 2006). 
23
 $YEHOM0³7KH3LWIDOOVRI&RPSDUDWLYH&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPIRU(XURSHDQ,QWHJUDWLRQ´Eric Stein Working Pa-
per (no. 1, 2008) pp. 1-28, 17. 
24
 6HH-DFREVRQ*-³&RQVWLWXWLRQDO,GHQWLW\´The Review of Politics (2006): 361-397; Jacobson, G.J., Consti-
tutional Identity (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press 2010); Mahlmann, M., ³&RQVWLWXWLRQDO,GHQWLW\DQGWKH
3ROLWLFVRI+RPRJHQHLW\´ German Law Journal (no. 2, 2005), pp. 307-317. 
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European member states, and that is traditionally likened to the principles of constitutionalism 
and territorial integrity.25 
Such a process corresSRQGVWRWKH³PDQXIDFWXULQJWUDGLWLRQ´typical in constitution-making pro-
FHVVHV$V/DXUHQFH7ULEHKDVKLJKOLJKWHG³WKHYHU\LGHQWLW\RIµWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶± the body of 
textual and historical materials from which [fundamental constitutional] norms are to be extract-
ed and by which their application is to be guided ± LV>«@DPDWWHU WKDWFDQQRWEHREMHFWLYHO\
deduced or passively discerned in a viewpoint-IUHHZD\´26 The materials can be literary, histor-
ical, pseudo-historical, and antiquarian ± they go beyond time and law. When forging its own 
constitutional identity, a community incorporates such values and traditions into its constitution-
al provisions, from which interpreters will subsequently carve out constitutional identity and its 
legal significance. 
In this respect, constitution-makers are narrators ± the storytellers of a thick constitutional iden-
tity.27 When creating constitutional identities, they use legal, literary, traditional, and social ma-
terials. Like a poet, a constitution-PDNHU³>VLQJV@IRUKLVFRQWHPSRUDULHV>«@KHLV>«@UHFDOOLQJ
WRKLVKHDUHUV¶PLQGVZHOO-known situations which could be conjured up by merely alluding to 
well-NQRZQHYHQWVDQGSHUVRQDJHV´28 The intent is the creation of a thick constitutional identi-
ty: the more the materials go beyond time and law, the thicker the new constitutional identity 
will be. 
In this essay, we will not examine all the facets of constitutional identity. We will rather refer to 
WKHUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQ³*HRJUDSK\DQG/DZ´29 i.e., in the creation of spatial, as well as legal, 
connections between the territory and the community upon which constitutional identity is 
HUHFWHG:KHQ LW FRPHV WR IHGHUDO VWXGLHV ³WHUULWRULDO LGHQWLW\´ UHVWVRQVHYHUDO IHDWXUHV WKHVH
may be economic, linguistic, religious, and ethnic.30 Whatever the legal significance of these 
features may be, territorial identity presupposes a close geographical interrelation between 
community and territory. Hence, boundaries are the visible and concrete expression of such a 
                                                 
25
 See Griffin, S.M., American Constitutionalism. From Theory to Politics (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University 
Press 1996). 
26
 7ULEH/+³$&RQVWLWXWLRQ:H$UH$PHQGLQJ$6HOI-'HIHQVHRID5HVWUDLQHG-XGLFLDO5ROH´Harvard Law 
Review (no. 2, December 1983), pp. 433-445, 440. 
27
 6HH.XPP0³7KH,GHDRI7KLFN&RQVWLWXWLRQDO3DWULRWLVPDQGLWV,PSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKH5ROHDQG6WUXFWXUHRI
(XURSHDQ/HJDO+LVWRU\´ LQ+3RUVGDPDQG7(OKROP(GVDialogues on Justice. European Perspectives on 
Law and Literature (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter 2012), pp. 108-137, 109. 
28
 Williams, R.A., The Finn Episode in Beowulf. An Essay in Interpretation (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press 1926), p. 4. 
29
 *URVVIHOG % ³*HRJUDSK\ DQG /DZ´ Michigan Law Review. Festschrift in Honor of Eric Stein (no. 5/6, 
April-May 1984), pp. 1510-1519. 
30
 ³7KHVHIDFWRUVDUHRIWKHXWPRVWLPSRUWDQFHLQFRPSDUDWLYHODZ>«@DVOHJDOVFKRODUVZHPXVWJLYHWKHPRXULn-
WHQVLYHDWWHQWLRQ´VHH*URVVIHOG%³*HRJUDSK\DQG/DZ´S 
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territorial divide; terULWRULDOXQLWV¶GHQRPLQDWLRQDQGERXQGDULHVRXWOLQHWKHWHUULWRULDOLGHQWLW\RI
the community, and this governs the process of formation of the constitutional identity. 
The creation of a thick constitutional territorial identity rests on several materials ± and the poli-
tics of both territorial denomination and boundaries outline this identity. At the same time, a 
WKLFNFRQVWLWXWLRQDO³WHUULWRULDO LGHQWLW\´DVVHUWV WKHOHJLWLPDF\DQGYDOLGLW\RISODFHQDPHVIRU
they are the linguistic evidence of the spatial relations between territory and community.31 To 
put it another way, territory and community are not separable, as the narrative of a constitutional 
identity resting on a place name upholds. In legal terms, constitutional identity confers legal sig-
nificance to the physical geography of a state as the central aspect of its identity ± and physical 
geography turns into legal geography.  
Indeed, place names and boundaries may be numbered among the constitutive parts of legal ge-
ography. F.W. Maitland first used this concept in his book Township and Borough, where he de-
ILQHG³OHJDOJHRJUDSK\´DVWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQFRPPXQLW\DQG its territory.32 These com-
munities ± families, clans, villages, ethnicities, etc. ± are claimants asserting an exclusive and 
close relation with a specific territory ± it is a spatial relation, legally relevant, that Maitland 
WHUPVDV³EHORQJVRISXEOLFODZV´33 The drawing of boundaries entails an even closer connec-
tion between land, community, and law, and highlights legal, economic, and social interactions 
between territory and institutionalized communities. 
7KHPRVW UHFHQW UHVHDUFKHVVKDUH WKHUDWLRQDOHRI0DLWODQG¶V OHJDOJHRJUDSK\ WKH UHODWLRQVKLS
between organized communities and territorial space. In this regard, scholars have also expand-
ed its scope: 
 
³/HJDOJHRJUDSK\LVQRWDVXEGLVFLSOLQHRIKXPDQJHRJUDSK\QRUGRHVLWQDPHDQDUHDRI
specialized legal scholarship. Rather, it refers to a truly interdisciplinary intellectual pro-
MHFW´34  
 
                                                 
31
 6HH&RDWHV5 ³1DPHV´ LQ5+RJJDQG''HQLVRA History of English Language (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 2006), 335 et seq. 
32
 Maitland, F.W., Township and Borough: The Ford Lectures 1897 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
1964), 6-7. The lineage of legal geography stretches back through the centuries up to the Domesday Book, the first 
socio-HFRQRPLFJHRJUDSKLFDO³PDS´RI(QJODQG6HH0DLWODQG):Domesday Book and beyond. Three essays in 
the Early History of England (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1987); Darby, H.C. et al., The Domesday 
Geography of England, 5 vols. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1954-67). See also Fleming, R., Domes-
day Book and the Law (Cambridge et al., Cambridge University Press 2003). 
33
 Maitland, F.W., Township and Borough, 11, 29. 
34
 Braverman, I., Blomley, N., Delaney D., and Kedar, A ³Expanding the Spaces of Law´ in I. Braverman, N., 
Blomley, D. Delaney, and A. Kedar, Alexandre (eds.), The Expanding Spaces of Law. A Timely Legal Geography 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press 2014), pp. 1-29. 1. 
 10 
 
In this regard, legal geography H[DPLQHVKRZWKH³VSDWLDOLW\RIODZ´RSHUDWHV³LIVRFLDOUHDOLW\
is shaped by and understood (or constituted) in terms of the legal, it is also shaped by and under-
VWRRGLQWHUPVRIVSDFHDQGSODFH´35  
Moreover, legal geography considers what can be labeleGDVWKH³ODZRIVSDWLDOLW\´± i.e., the le-
gal consideration of all geographic features (physical, anthropic, economic, and social). This is 
apparent in the works both of Manfred Langhans-Ratzeburg ± on the legal consideration of the 
cartographic representation of law±and of Walther Merk, which expressly referred to legal 
(Rechtsgeographie).36  
)XUWKHUPRUHOHJDOJHRJUDSK\FRQVLGHUVSODFHQDPHVERXQGDULHVDQG³WHUULWRULDOVHJPHQWDODu-
WRQRP\´ZKLFK³PHDQVLQSUDFWLFDOO\DOOFDVHVDIHGHUDODUUDQJHPHQW´37 Among its constitu-
WLYHIHDWXUHVZHPD\DOVRQXPEHUWKRVHPHFKDQLVPVDFFRUGLQJWRZKLFKFRQVWLWXHQWXQLWV¶DUH
created and boundaries are drawn or altered. Legal geography complements the rules of federal-
ism, and it is a principle of organization in multi- or bi-ethnic federal states, allowing power-
sharing mechanisms to work.38 
To sum up, legal geography encompasses several institutes (regional demarcation, place-name 
policies, territorial alteration, and power sharing) and represents a legal approach complement-
ing the comparative method.39 This methodological approach is not confined to the mere study 
of black-letter federal constitutions, but it contributes to filling in the gaps between written pro-
visions and the practice of law. 
Furthermore, legal geographic studies shares fields of research with linguistics ± both diachronic 
and synchronic. This is manifest in the linguistic studies of place names ±intriguing research in-
to both the remnants of former communities and the merging of different identities.40 Further-
                                                 
35
 Blomley, N., Delaney, D., and Ford, R7³Preface: Where is law´ in N. Blomley, D., Delaney, D., and T. R. 
Ford, The Legal Geographies Reader. Law, Powers, and Space (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 2001), pp. xiii-xxii, 
xv. 
36
 See Langhans-Ratzeburg, M., Begriff und Aufgaben der geographischen Rechtswissenschaft (Geojurisprudenz) 
(Berlin-Grunewald, K. Vowickel 1928); Merk, W., Wege und Ziele der Geschichtlichen Rechtsgeographie (Berlin, 
G. Stille 1926). 
37
 /LMSKDUW$³&RQVRFLDWLRQDQG)HGHUDWLRQ&RQFHSWXDODQG(PSLULFDO/LQNV´Canadian Journal of Political 
Science (no. 3, September 1979), pp. 499-515, 505. 
38
 See Duchacek, I.D., Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics (New York, Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, Inc. 1971); Agranoff, R. (Ed.), Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States (Baden-
Baden, Nomos 1999); Burgess, M. and Pinder, J. (Eds.), Multinational Federations (Abingdon, Routledge 2007). 
39
 2QOHJDOJHRJUDSK\DVDPHWKRGRORJ\FRPSOHPHQWLQJFRPSDUDWLYHODZVHHDOVR*URVVIHOG%³*HRJUDSK\DQG
/DZ´S7KHDXWKRUKRZHYHUFRQILQHVOHJDOJHRJUDSK\WRWKHSUHVXSSRVLWLRQDIIHFWLQJWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIRU
imposing modifications on, legal institutes. 
40
 Remnants characterize the Celtic substrate in the geography of Anglo-6D[RQ(QJODQGVHH7RZQHQG0³&Rn-
WDFWVDQG&RQIOLFWV/DWLQ1RUVHDQG)UHQFK´LQ0XJJOHVWRQH/The Oxford History of English (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 2012), pp. 75-105, 80. On interactions between Old English and Old Norse in place names, see 
Baugh, A.C. and Cable, T., A History of the English Language (London and New York, Routledge 2013, 6th edi-
tion), p. 94. On diatopic variation in English word geRJUDSK\VHH0F,QWRVK$³:RUG*HRJUDSK\LQWKH/H[LFRg-
UDSK\RI0HGLDHYDO(QJOLVK´Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences (no. 1, June 1973), pp. 55-66. 
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more, geographical linguistics draws boundaries in dialectology: these are the so-called iso-
glossesZKLFK³ZLOOQRWFRPPRQO\FRLQFLGHRUEXQGOHWRJHWKHUZLWKRQHDQRWKHULQVXFKDZD\
DVWRGHILQHDVLQJOHILUPDQGVDWLVIDFWRU\GLDOHFWERXQGDU\´41  
This is the case with Scottish identity, whose linguistic features frequently overlap. On the one 
hand, the boundary drawn between England and devolved Scotland ± DQGZKLFKWKHQ³Vtretched 
from the Humber to the ForthEXWQRWIXUWKHU1RUWK´42±severs Scots (a variety derived from Old 
English) from English.43 On the other hand, there are linguistic markers and types of variation 
that draw geolinguistic boundaries in the British Isles ± DPRQJ WKHP WKH³UKRWLFLW\´ LH WKH
pronounciation of /r/ after a vowel where it is present in the written word); a different pro-
QRXQFLDWLRQIRU³ZK-³ZKLFKLVLQGHHGSURQRXQFHG>KZ@VXFKDVLQZKHQ>KZܭn]; the use of [u:] 
LQDXZRUGVVXFKDV³KRXVH´± which is the sound before the onset of the Great Vowel Shift, 
which did not fully take place in Scotland.44 
Despite this, scholars with a background in geographical linguistics have succeeded in complet-
ing a number of linguistic atlases such as the Linguistic Atlas of Late Mediaeval English.45 In 
some cases, legal geography and linguistic geography overlap. In a diachronic perspective, the 
878 Treaty of Wedmore between Guthrum, the Danish King, and Alfred, King of Wessex, as-
VHUWHGWKHLUUHVSHFWLYH³EHORQJVRISXEOLFODZV´RQDVSHFLILFWHUULWRU\DQGHVWDEOLshed a closer 
connection between land, community, and law. It is the so-FDOOHG'DQHODZ LH WKH ³WHUULWRU\
>«@VXEMHFWWR'DQLVKODZ´46 demarcated through a boundary running roughly from Chester to 
/RQGRQ7KH'DQLVK³EHORQJVRISXEOLFODZ´GHILQHGWKHOHgal relationship between the territory 
and the community, and comprised the single constitutive parts of the legal-linguistic geography 
of Danish rule: place-names politics,47 linguistic borrowings, a legal system and boundaries de-
limiting the area of the same Danelaw. 
                                                 
41
 See Burrow, J.A. and Turville-Petre, T., A Book of Middle English (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing 2005), p. 6. 
The pioneer of linguistic geography was Matteo Bartoli: see Bartoli, M., Introduzione alla neolinguistica (Florence, 
L.S. Olschki 1925). 
42
 'DYLHV55³Presidential Address: The Peoples of Britain and Ireland 1100-1400. II. Names, Boundaries and 
Regnal Solidarities´ 5 Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (1995), pp. 1-20, 1-2 
43
 Smith, J.J., Essential of Early English. An Introduction to Old, Middle and Early Modern English (London and 
New York, Routledge 2005, 2nd edition), pp. 9-10. 
44
 See Beal, J. C., An Introduction to Regional Englishes: Dialect Variation in England (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press 2011); USWRQ& ³0RGHUQ5HJLRQDO(QJOLVK LQ WKH%ULWLVK,VOHV´ LQL. Mugglestone (ed.), The 
Oxford History of English (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2012), pp. 379-414, 386. 
45
 McIntosh, A., Samuels, M.L., and Beskin, M., with Laing, M. and Williamson, K., A Linguistic Atlas of Late 
Mediaeval English, 4 Vols. (Aberdeen, Aberdeen University Press 1986). 
46
 Baugh, A.C. and Cable, T., A History, p. 89. The Danelaw as a legal-geographic relation between territory and 
FRPPXQLW\FRUUHVSRQGV WR WKH³DUHD WR WKHQRUWKDQGHDVWRI WKHROG5RPDQ URDGNQRZQDV:DWOLQJ6WUHHW´ VHH
7RZQHQG0³&RQWDFWVDQG&RQIOLFWV/DWLQ1RUVHDQG)UHQFK´S 
47
 6WHQWRQ)0³3UHVLGHQWLDO$GGUHVV7KH+LVWRULFDO%HDULQJRI3ODFH-Name Studies: The Danish Settlement of 
(DVWHUQ(QJODQG´Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fourth Series (1942), pp. 1-24. 
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When it comes to the synchronic perspective, there are noticeable overlaps between linguistics 
and legal geography, including, among others, place-related words defining the types of federal-
ism in the United States and the EU. Both America and Europe refer to a continent, i.e., desig-
QDWHVSHFLILF³EHORQJVRISXEOLFODZ´LQOLQJXLVWLFWHUPVRQWKHRWKHUKDQGAmerica ³VHUYHVDV
[a] potent label for one nation that occupies only the middle reaches of the northern part of the 
$PHULFDV´ ZKLOH LQ WKH ODWH WZHQWLHWK FHQWXU\ ³Europe acquired an additional sense that 
brought it into line with America: it now meant not only the whole continent, but served as 
shorthand for the European Union (EU), a politico-economic federation, which occupies only 
parWRI WKDWFRQWLQHQW´48 When comparing and contrasting EU and U.S. federalism, linguistics 
adds relevant arguments to legal geography ± place-related words are indeed part of the consti-
tutional identity of the federalism in question. It also sets an additional layer of complexity, 
since the politics of place names determines to what extent denominational issues match the 
demarcation of both federations, i.e. their territorial constitutional identity. 
 
4. From Territory to Constitutional Identities, via Legal Geography 
 
/HJDOJHRJUDSK\LQJHQHUDODQGGHQRPLQDWLRQDOLVVXHVLQSDUWLFXODUUHDOO\DIIHFWWKHZD\³WHr-
ULWRULDO´FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLGHQWLW\LVEXLOW,QWKLVUHJDUGWKH\RIIHUDQDUUDWLYHWKDWLVDOWHUQDWLYHWR
the traditional and federal-experience narratives. This is particularly true as far as processes 
governing the formation of the legal geography of the two types of federalism are concerned. 
The formation of both types of federalism reveals analogies and discrepancies between their re-
spective legal geographies, such as in the case of regional demarcation, which governs the divi-
sion of the federal territory into territorial constituent units.49 
As the EU and the United States may be considered aggregative federalisms, the outcome of 
demarcation usually coincides with the boundaries of pre-existing units that have come together 
and created a new federation. As for the EU, these were the six founding member states, where-
as in the United States the previously independent political communities that integrated into the 
confederative system were the former 13 English colonies that had become sovereign states. 
This first step was represented by the Resolution passed by the Second Continental Congress on 
0D\ ³That it be recommended to the respective assemblies and conventions of the 
United Colonies, where no government sufficient to the exigencies of their affair have been 
                                                 
48
 0F$UWKXU7³(QJOLVK:RUOG-ZLGHLQWKH7ZHQWLHWK&HQWXU\´LQ0XJJOHVWRQH/The Oxford History of Eng-
lish (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2012), pp. 446-487, 471. 
49
 6HH5DPXWVLQGHOD0)DQG6LPRQ'³7KH3ROLWLFVRIWHUULWRU\DQG3ODFHLQ3RVW-Apartheid South Africa: the 
'LVSXWHG$UHDRI%XVKEXFNULGJH´Journal of Southern Africa Studies (no. 2, September 1999), pp. 479-481. 
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hitherto established, to adopt such government as shall, in the opinion of the representatives of 
the people, best conduce to the happiness of their constituents in particular, and American safety 
LQJHQHUDO´50 
0RUHRYHUERWKWKH(8DQGWKH86SURFHVVHVRIGHPDUFDWLRQSURYHGWREHHIIHFWLYH³ZRUNVLQ
SURJUHVV´%RWKIHGHUDOGHVLJQVKDYHDFFUXHG WKHLU WHUULWRU\E\YLUWXHRI WKH admission of new 
member states, and the sole difference consists in the fact that the EU admits existing sovereign, 
independent states [Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU)], while U.S. constitu-
ent units were carved out of former federal territories that would be subsequently admitted into 
the federation.51 
Processes governing the gradual formation of the EU and the United States shed noticeable light 
on the word geography (and on the constitutional identity) of both types of federalism. With re-
spect to the United States, the label America designates the continent, and complements the 
8QLWHG6WDWHV¶FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLGHQWLW\/HJDODQGOLQJXLVWLFJHRJUDSKLHVWKXVSHUIHFWO\PDWFKDQG
the progressive admission of new states may now be considered as completed in the continental 
United States. U.S. member states occupy the entire middle reaches of the northern part of the 
Americas between Mexico and Canada, and there is only room left for the admission of new 
states that have an insular, i.e., a physically geographic demarcated, character, such as Puerto 
Rico. 
By contrast, EU Treaties set a precise legal requirement for the admission of new states into the 
Union: states must be European. Despite the indication of a geographically oriented requirement 
IRUDGPLVVLRQWKH³FULWHULRQRI(XURSHDQ-QHVV>«@LVEHVWXQGHUVWRRGDVDORRVHJHRJUDSKLFDO´
one:52 the geolinguistic concept of Europe does not have clear boundaries, and its application 
fades into the geographical continuity that characterizes the Euro-Asiatic continent. 
It follows that European linguistic geography does not match its legal geography, and this un-
GHUPLQHV(8³WHUULWRULDOLGHQWLW\´,WFRXOGEHDUJXHGWKDWZKHQDGPLWWLQJSURVSHFWLYHPHPEHUV
the Copenhagen criteria might complement the multifarious features upon which EU constitu-
tional (and territorial) identity is built. These criteria are incorporated into Article 49 of the 
7(8ZKLFKKRZHYHUPHUHO\UHIOHFWVD³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOFRPPLWPHQWWRKXPDQULJKWVGHPRFUa-
F\DQGWKHUXOHRIODZ´ that is not specifically European.53 The abstract commitment to human 
rights thus has a direct backlash on the concrete demarcation of the EU: new member states will 
                                                 
50
 ³7KH6WDWHVDQGWKH&RQJUHVV0RYH7RZDUG,QGHSHQGHQFH-´Publius. The States as Keystones: A 
Bicentennial Reassessment (no. 1, Winter 1976), pp. 135-143, at 141. 
51
 See Story, J., Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, II (Boston, Little, Brown and Company 
1858), p. 189 et seq. 
52
 6HH.XPP0³7KH,GHDRI7KLFN&RQVWLWXWLRQDO3DWULRWLVP´S2. 
53
 6HH.XPP0³7KH,GHDRI7KLFN&RQVWLWXWLRQDO3DWULRWLVP´S 
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be admitted provided that they respect human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It follows 
that the European character of prospective members is becoming irrelevant. This seems to con-
tradict traditional legal geographic studies, where boundaries constitute the visible expression of 
FOHDUWHUULWRULDO³EHORQJVDQGGLYLGHVRISXEOLFODZ7KH absence of a clear boundary for a pro-
VSHFWLYH(8WHUULWRU\PDNHVLWV³EHORQJVRISXEOLFODZ´HYHQORRVHU7KLVLVGXHWRWKHIDFWWKDWD
clear geographical interrelation between community and territory lacks in the EU: indeed, mem-
EHUVWDWHV¶WHUULWRU\PHUely define the territorial scope of the Treaties [see Art. 52 of the TEU 
and Art. 355 of the Treaty on the Function of the European Union (TFEU)]. As a consequence, 
the process of the formation of EU constitutional identity departs from those typical of state-
building processes. 
There is another discrepancy between the legal geographies of the EU and the United States. 
7KH(8LVDPHUHVXPRI³EHORQJVRISXEOLFODZ´(DFK³EHORQJ´ZKLFKFRUUHVSRQGVWRWKHJHo-
graphical interrelation between community and territory of each member, is delineated by visi-
ble boundaries, concrete geography, and historical place-name politics, and it is governed by in-
stitutLRQV UHIOHFWLQJ WKH VDPH ³EHORQJ´ $OWKRXJK WKH (8 KDV WUDLWV LQ FRPPRQ ZLWK
multinational federations, it only aims to demarcate the territorial scope of the Treaties by 
holding together the different EU demoi in a single quasi-federal structure. This assumption 
OHDGV WRDQRWKHUGLVFUHSDQF\ UHJDUGLQJ(8DQG86 VRFLHWLHV:KHUHDV WKH(8 LVD ³PXOWLQa-
WLRQDO´ ³IHGHUDO-OLNH´ SROLW\ WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV LV D KRPRJHQHRXV IHGHUDWLRQ7KLVPHDQV WKDW
³>W@HUULWRU\ LQ WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV H[FHSW IRU WKH ,QGLDQFRXQWUy) is essentially neutral, that is, a 
EODQNVODWHWREHILOOHGLQE\ZKRPHYHUOLYHVRQWKHWHUULWRU\´54 Territorial neutrality standardiz-
HVPHPEHUVWDWHV¶LGHQWLW\³VHWWOHUVJLYHOLIHDQGPHDQLQJWRDWHUULWRU\´EXW³VXEVHTXHQWUHVi-
GHQWV>«@>PD\DGDSW@WKHMXULVGLFWLRQ¶VLQVWLWXWLRQVWRFKDQJLQJWLPHVDQGWKHLUSUHIHUHQFHV´55 
The homogeneous nature of U.S. federalism can be traced back to the fact that constituent units 
were carved out of the federal territories and then admitted into the federation. The federal gov-
HUQPHQW WKXV VKDSHGPHPEHU VWDWHV¶ WHUULWRULDO LGHQWLW\ ERXQGDULHV DQGGHQRPLQDWLRQSULRU WR
their accession to the federation.56 
7KH IHGHUDO JRYHUQPHQW VXSHUYLVHG WKH SURFHVVHV RI WHUULWRULDO GHOLPLWDWLRQ )LUVW ³>W@KH&Rn-
gress [had] Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Ter-
                                                 
54
 .LQFDLG-³7HUULWRULDO1HXWUDOLW\DQG&RHUFLYH)HGHUDOLVPLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´LQ60DQJLDPHOL(GFeder-
alism, Regionalism and Territory (Milan, Giuffrè 2013), pp. 133-147, 133. 
55
 .LQFDLG-³7HUULWRULDO1HXWUDOLW\DQG&RHUFLYH)HGHUDOLVPLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´SS-134. 
56
 On state admission, see U.S. Supreme Court, The American Insurance Company and The Ocean Insurance Com-
pany (New York) v. David Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). On the territorial clause, see Leibowitz, A.H., Defin-
ing Status. A Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publish-
ers 1989), p. 6 et seq. 
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ULWRU\ >«@ EHORQJLQJ WR WKH8QLWHG 6WDWHV´ DQG VWDWHVZHUH FDUYHG RXW IURP WKRVH WHUULWRULHV
(territorial clause $UWLFOH ,9 V  FO  RI WKH 86 &RQVWLWXWLRQ 6HFRQG ³>Q@HZ 6tates 
>PLJKW@EHDGPLWWHGE\WKH&RQJUHVVLQWR>WKH@8QLRQ´$UWLFOH,9VFORIWKH&RQVWLWu-
tion). Third, admission implied the application of the criteria set forth in the Northwestern Ordi-
nance 1787 DQGWKHGHPDUFDWLRQRIVWDWHV¶ERUGHUVZKLFK followed ³VWUDLJKWOLQHVODLGGRZQE\
VXUYH\RUV´57 Fourth, admission led to the conferral of statehood to the new states, and statehood 
implied the certification of state constitutions under the Republican Form of Government clause 
(or Guarantee clause: Article IV, s. 4, of the U.S. Constitution).58 
When admitting new constituent units, the U.S. federal government not only acknowledged their 
VWDWHKRRGEXW DOVR WKHLU ³EHORQJVRISXEOLF ODZ´ZKLFKDUH KRZHYHU IHHEOHU DQG ORRVHU WKDQ
those of the EU member states.59 +HQFHXQLWV¶ WHUULWRULDO LGHQWLW\ LV WKHRXWFRPHRID UHVWOHVV
process through which U.S. territory and community have become inseparable, upholding the 
narrative of a strong constitutional identity and forging U.S. legal geography. 60 Admission to 
the EU generates the legal geography of the integration process, too: on the one hand, admission 
does not confer statehood to prospective member states, but bestows European-ness upon them. 
Thus, the EU generates Europe and shapes its own legal geography. Unlike U.S. legal geogra-
phy, European legal geography will never be considered complete because the progressive ad-
PLVVLRQRIQHZ³(XURSHDQ´VWDWHVLVDPDWWHURISROLWLFVQRWRISK\VLFDOJHRJUDSK\ 
From this, it does not follow, however, that the EuropeDQ8QLRQKDVLWVRZQ³EHORQJVRISXEOLF
ODZ´)LUVW(XURSHDQ-ness is the effect (and not the cause) of admission to the EU. Second, the 
EU lacks a definite territorial demarcation. Third, EU territory is the mere sum of member 
VWDWHV¶WHUULWRULHVDQG³EHORQJVRISXEOLFODZ´)RXUWK(8WHUULWRU\FRLQFLGHVZLWKWKHterritorial 
scope of the Treaties. This precludes a concrete and tangible process of self-identification be-
tween the EU demoi and EU territory, and the EU does not conceive of its institutions as repre-
sentative of this sum of different territories, peoples, and belongs, but of the individual member 
states. As far as European-ness is concerned, the EU confers legal and abstract significance onto 
PHPEHUVWDWHV¶SK\VLFDOJHRJUDSK\ZKLFKWKXVWXUQVLnto an abstract EU legal geography. 
 
                                                 
57
 .LQFDLG-³7HUULWRULDO1HXWUDOLW\DQG&RHUFLYH)HGHUDOLVPLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´S 
58
 /HUFKH&2-U³7KH*XDUDQWHH&ODXVHLQ&RQVWLWXWLRQDO/DZ´The Western Political Quarterly (no. 3, Sep-
tember 1949), pp. 358-374. 
59
 With the exception of WKH6RXWKZKLFK³KDVORQJEHHQWKHFRXQWU\¶VPRVWGLVWLQFWLYHUHJLRQVRPXFKVRWKDWWKH
8QLWHG6WDWHVZDVLQLPSRUWDQWUHVSHFWVDELFRPPXQDOIHGHUDWLRQIURPWRDERXW´.LQFDLG-³7HUULWo-
rial Neutrality and Coercive Federalism in the UniteG6WDWHV´S 
60
 6HH'XIIH\'3³7KH1RUWKZHVW2UGLQDQFHDVD&RQVWLWXWLRQDO'RFXPHQW´Columbia Law Review (no. 4, 
May 1995), 929-³7KURXJKWKH2UGLQDQFHWKHVWDWHVDWWHPSWHGWRUHSURGXFH± to create entities like them-
VHOYHV>«@WKHSROLWLFDOUHSURGXFWLRQ>«@ZDVSURYLGHGWRSUHVHUYHDQGSHUSHWXDWHGWKHGLVWLQFWLYHSROLWLFDOOLIHWKDW
WKHVWDWHVKDGZRQLQWKH:DUIRU,QGHSHQGHQFH´ 
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5. Towards a Thick Constitutional Identity and a Concrete Legal Geography for the EU 
 
,W LV LQGLVSXWDEOH WKDW WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶FRQFUHWH IHGHUDO-oriented legal geography produces a 
thick constitutional identity. Not only is this legal geography strictly connected to the formation 
and elaboration of national identity, but it also exhibits the above-mentioned legal and non-legal 
SUHVXSSRVLWLRQVOLQNLQJWKLFNFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLGHQWLW\WRWKH³VRFLDOFXOWXUDODVZHOODVHFonomic 
HQYLURQPHQWZLWKLQZKLFK >FRQVWLWXWLRQDO LGHQWLW\@ HIIHFWLYHO\ FDPH LQWR EHLQJ´61 In this re-
VSHFWWKH86QDUUDWLYHFRUUHVSRQGVWRZKDWKDVEHHQWHUPHGDQLGHQWLW\VKDSHG³LQWKHSUHVHQW
from the connection with the struggles of the past and the DPELWLRQVIRUWKHIXWXUH´62 
(Thick) constitutional identity is also a key concept as far as the European historical narrative is 
concerned.63 First, nobody can arguethat the framers of the European treaties have been trying to 
confer an autonomous constitutional identity on the EU since the very inception of the integra-
tion process. In this regard, we have already noted that ECJ played a crucial role in supporting 
WKH(8¶s institutional evolution in the foundational period through the already-PHQWLRQHG³FRn-
VWLWXWLRQDOL]DWLRQ´ of the supranational legal system.64 Furthermore, EU treaties entrench a vast 
array of principles, values, and aims, as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union.65 
6HFRQGWKH(8¶VVXSUDQDWLRQDOOHJDORUGHUUHVWVRQDVHWRISULQFLSOHVVKDUHGE\PHPEHUVWDWHV
the protection of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; the constitutional traditions common to the 
member states, as interpreted by the ECJ.66 
7KLUG ³FRQVWLWXWLRQDO WUDGLWLRQV´ FRPPRQ WR PHPEHU VWDWHV DUH FORVHO\ FRQQHFWHG ZLWK WKHLU
³Qational identities, inherent in their fundamental structurHVSROLWLFDODQGFRQVWLWXWLRQDO´ which 
the Union shall respect under Article 4(2) of the TEU. The question left unanswered by this pro-
YLVLRQLVZKRVKRXOGEHWKHILQDODGMXGLFDWRULQGLVSXWHVUHODWHGWRPHPEHUVWDWHV¶FRQVWLWXWLRQDO
identity. Whereas the U.S. Supreme Court stated that it would not decide political questions, i.e., 
³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOTXHVWLRQV>«@LQYROYLQJ>WKH@FRQVWLWXWLRQDOVWUXFWXUH´RIWKHPHPEHUVWDWHVXn-
                                                 
61
 -DFREVRQ*-³&RQVWLWXWLRQDO,GHQWLW\´S 
62
 .XPP0³7KH,GHDRI7KLFN&RQVWLWXWLRQDO3DWULRWLVP´S 
63
 See, among others, S. Garcia, European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy (London, Pinter Publishers 1993). 
64
 See supra para. 1. See, also, Forsyth, M., Unions of States ± The Theory and Practice of Confederation (Leices-
ter, Leicester University Press 1981); Weiler, J.H.H., The Constitution of Europe, p. 188 et seq.  
65
 See Articles 2, 3, 6(1) of the EU Treaty, respectively. 
66
 6HH$UWLFOHRIWKH(87UHDW\2QWKH³FRPPRQ´FRQVWLWXWLRQDOWUDGLWLRQVVHH-RQHV-³µ&Rmmon Constitu-
WLRQDO7UDGLWLRQV¶&DQWKH0HDQLQJRI+XPDQ'LJQLW\XQGHU*HUPDQ/DZ*XLGHWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI-XVWLFH"´ 
Public Law (no. 1, January 2004), pp. 167-6DEHO&)DQG*HUVWHQEHUJ2³&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVLQJDQ2YHUODp-
ping Consensus: The ECJ DQG WKH(PHUJHQFHRI D&RRUGLQDWH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO2UGHU´ European Law Journal 
(no. 5, September 2010), pp. 511-550. 
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der the Guarantee clause,67 the interpretation of Article 4(2) is the most contentious issue aris-
ing in the EU constitutional environment.  
,WFRXOGEHDUJXHGWKDWXQGHU$UWLFOHPHPEHUVWDWHV¶FRQVWLWXWLRQDO LGHQWLW\LVHYHQWXDOO\
incorporated into EU law. The assumption is held by the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the economic and monetary union (TSCG) signed in Brussels on February 2, 
2010. In effect, constraints imposing that the budgetary position of the member states must be 
balanced or in surplus progressively deprive member states of their constitutional Kompetenz-
Kompetenz: ³7KHVWDELOLW\WUHDW\QRWRQO\UHTXLUHV>«@FRQVWLWXWLRQDOFKDQJHVLQHDFKRIWKHVLg-
natory states, but also raises significant questions about its relationship with EU law and the ex-
tent of the discretion left to member states to make fundamental decisions about taxation and 
spending.´68 
There is, however, a fundamental objection to the assertion that the EU has the power to rule on 
PHPEHU VWDWHV¶ FRQVWLWXWLRQDO LGHQWLW\ DQG WKH(&- LV WKH ILQDO DGMXGLFDWRURIGLVSXWHV UHODWHG
thereto. Such powers seem to be incompatible with the same concept of constitutional identity, 
which refers to a specific state, as opposed to constitutional traditions, which are in turn com-
mon to both the Union and member states. Furthermore, the powers of final adjudication are 
challenged by national constitutional courts, which in most cases have ultimately determined the 
identity of the respective member state.69 
This is due to the fact that the Union can really affect national constitutional identity. This oc-
curred in the case of Ireland. Although Irish is the official language of Ireland and one of the of-
ficial languages of the EU (Article 8(1) of the Irish Constitution and Article 55 of the TEU), it 
was taken into consideration as a working language of the EU until 2006, when the Council in-
cluded it among the languages to be used in the European Union.70 In addition, the constitution-
DO FROOHFWLYH VLJQLILFDQFH RI &DWKROLFLVP LQ ,UHODQG KDV EHHQ SURJUHVVLYHO\ FKDOOHQJHG ³E\ D
JURZLQJHPSKDVLVRQWKHULJKWVRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO´71 Moreover, EU requirements related to the 
establishment of a common market founded on the free movement of goods, persons, services 
                                                 
67
 See Tribe, L.H, American Constitutional Law (New York, The Foundation Press 2000, 3rd edition), p. 366 et seq.; 
Tushnet, M., The Constitution of the United States of America. A Contextual Analysis (Oxford and Portland, OR, 
Hart Publishing 2009), pp. 148-149. For the case law, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 
663 (1962). 
68
 3HHUV6³7KH6WDELOLW\7UHDW\3HUPDQHQW$XVWHULW\RU*HVWXUH3ROLWLFV"´European Constitutional Law Re-
view (no. 3, October 2012), pp. 404-441, 404. 
69
 See, among others, Conseil constitutionnel, judgment 27 July 2006, 2006-504 DC. 
70
 On January 1, 2007, Irish became an official EU working language. See EEC Regulation no. 1/1958 as amended 
E\&RXQFLO5HJXODWLRQ(&QR6HH8UUXWLD,DQG/DVDJDEDVWHU,³Language Rights as a General Prin-
FLSOHRI&RPPXQLW\/DZ´German Law Journal (no. 5, 2007), pp. 479-500. 
71
 6HH*HUDUG:K\WH³5HOLJLRQDQGWKH,ULVK&RQVWLWXWLRQ´John Marshall Law Review (no. 3, Spring 1997), pp. 
725-747, 725.  
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DQGFDSLWDOKDGQRWLFHDEOHHIIHFWVRQ,UHODQG¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLGHQWLW\ZKLFKVXEVHTXHQWO\KDGWR
amend its Constitution with respect to abortion.72 
The current financial crisis is undermining the same presuppositions of the EU integration pro-
cess and, to a bigger extent, the same EU identity-building process. In this regard, the crisis 
gives rise to issues that are related to global economic governance. Hence, international finan-
cial actors such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,73 as well as private-
sector investors, endorse the transformation of the economic premises the same EU integration 
process rests on. In particular, international financial actors suggest the adoption of a common-
law-oriented legal tradition that is capable of supporting a capitalist socioeconomic model, but 
that totally departs from the model of Soziale Marktwirtschaft (i.e., social market econo-
my)enshrined in Article 3 TEU.74 7KLVLVFDXVHGE\LQWHUQDWLRQDOLQYHVWPHQWODZZKLFK³shifts 
power and authority from states to investors, tribunals and other decision-PDNHUV´DQG³>W@KHVH
VKLIWVSURGXFHRXWFRPHV WKDWRQO\SDUWLDOO\ VXSSRUW JOREDOSROLFLHV´ DVZHOO Ds the transfer of 
power and authority to decision-makers who are not democratically accountable.75  
It is obvious that the effects of the economic crisis are even more remarkable when they affect 
WKH(8LH³DQHQWLW\ZKRVHFORVHVWVWUXFWXUDOPRGHOLVQRORQJHUDQLQWernational organization 
but a denser, yet non-XQLWDU\SROLW\´WKDWKDVWUDLWVLQFRPPRQZLWKWKHIHGHUDOVWDWHLQJHQHUDO
and U.S. federalism, in particular.76 7KH(8¶Vabstract legal geography is even more apparent: 
LWKLJKOLJKWVWKHDEVHQFHRI(8³EHORQJVRISXEOLFODZ´WKHUHKDVQRWEHHQDVKLIWIURPWKHDg-
JUHJDWHRIVWDWHV¶WKLFNLGHQWLWLHVWRWKHFUHDWLRQRIFRPPRQLQVWLWXWLRQVFDSDEOHRIUHSUHVHQWLQJ
communities and territory, and this is one of the fallacies of the integration process. Although 
the EU tends to accommodate different European polities and societies on the basis of common 
values embedded in the Treaties, a constitutional identity comparable to that of its member 
states and of the United States is currently lacking.  
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 ,QWKLVUHJDUGDFRQVWLWXWLRQDODPHQGPHQWDFNQRZOHGJHG³WKHULJKWWROLIHRIWKHXQERUQZLWKGXHUegard to 
WKHHTXDOULJKWWROLIHRIWKHPRWKHU´$UWLFOH&RQVW6HH+DQDILQ3³5HSURGXFWLYH5LJKWVDQGWKH,ULVK&Rn-
VWLWXWLRQ)URPWKH6DQFWLW\RI/LIHWRWKH6DQFWLW\RI$XWRQRP\"´European journal of Health Law (1996), pp. 
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(GV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World. Selected Essays (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1991), p. 15. 
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 On the negation of the Soziale Marktwirtschaft model in Germany, the country where the model was invented, 
VHH5XIIHUW0³3XEOLF/DZDQG WKH(FRQRP\$FRPSDUDWLYHYLHZIURPWKH*HUPDQSHUVSHFWLYH´ 11 Interna-
tional Journal of Constitutional Law (no. 4, 2013), pp. 925-939. 
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 Cheng, T.-&³3RZHU$XWKRULW\DQG,QWHUQDWLRQDO,QYHVWPHQW/DZ´American University International Law 
Review (no. 3, 2005), pp. 465-520, 469. 
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In this regard, ³WKHSODXVLELOLW\DQGUHTXLVLWHQHVVRI(XURSHDVDGHPRV´77 that is to say, the pos-
sibility that the EU rests on a political community, requires more than a general commitment to 
abstract universal principles, which only serves as the legal requirements for the admission of 
prospective member states. In this thin commitment³WKHUHLVQRWKLQJVSHFLILFDOO\(XURSHDQ´78 
When addressing a financial crisis, a thick constitutional identity-building process cannot rest on 
the creation of mere mechanisms for financial governance, such as those established by the 
TSCG. In this regard, the U.S. constitutional-federal experience and vocabulary might certainly 
provide Europe with additional solutions to face the current economic crisis. The financial di-
vide between the EU member states reveals the lack of a sole demos, and impedes narratives 
similar to those that led to the establishment of an ever more perfect union in the United States, 
LHWKRVHQDUUDWLYHVWKDWSHUVXDGHG$OH[DQGHU+DPLOWRQWR³VXFFHVVIXOO\>UHVWUXFWXUH@$PHULFD¶V
FULSSOLQJVRYHUHLJQGHEWLQWKHVE\µIHGHUDOL]LQJ¶WKHVWDWHV¶GHEW´79  
Hence, a comparative legal examination of the EU and U.S. types of federalism reveals that the 
U.S. narrative succeeded in establishing its own thick constitutional identity because the United 
States possessed the legal and non-legal presuppositions allowing the establishment of such a 
thick constitutional identity. These certainly had a historical lineage that stretches back through 
the centuries, until the revolutiRQDU\³ELJEDQJ´FDXVHGE\WKH3KLODGHOSKLD&RQYHQWLRQ± but a 
QDWLRQDOFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLGHQWLW\LVDOVR³FRQQHFWHGWRWKHSDUWLFXODUKLVWRU\DPELWLRQVDQGFXUUHQW
SROLWLFDOSUDFWLFHVRIDSDUWLFXODUFRPPXQLW\´80  
This is due to the fact that the United States elaborated and guided a specific national political 
DFWLRQ WKDW H[SUHVVHG WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV¶ SHFXOLDU UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ LWV FRPPXQLW\ LWV Ue-
ceived cultural traditions, and its territory, in relation to which identity is construed, i.e., a con-
crete legal geography. The same will occur to the quasi-federal EU integration process whenev-
er it defines exactly what European-ness means. When the legal and the linguistic geographies 
of the EU match perfectly, i.e., when Europe conceives of itself as a territorially, physically and 
legally geographic demarcated polity, the criterion of European-ness will not be understood as a 
loose geographical tie anymore. Europe will then be based on a concrete legal geography, and 
this will mean the time for a thick constitutional identity has come. 
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